




WITH reference to this subject of great and growing import-
ance it is purposed in the present article briefly to notice, in one
or two aspects, two leading features, viz.: First, The validity of
an unstamped instrument as dependent upon the intent with
which the stamp was omitted; and Second, The presumption as
to this intent when the fact of the omission, simply, appears.
First. Sect. 158 of the Stamp Act provides: That any per-
son or persons who shall make, sign, or issue, or who shall cause
to be made, signed, or issued, any instrument, document, or paper
of any kind or description whatsoever, or shall accept, negotiate,
or pay, or cause to be accepted, negotiated, or paid, any bill of
exchange, draft or order, or promissory note for the payment of
money, without the same being duly stamped, or having there-
upon an adhesive stamp for denoting the tax chargeable thereon,
and cancelled in the manner required by law, with intent to evade
the provisions of this act, shall for every such offence, forfeit the
sum of fifty dollars, and such instrument, document or paper, bill,
draft, order, or note, not being stamped according to law, shall
be deemed invalid and of no effect.
That in some cases unstamped instruments are void under this
section is clear, but in just what instances depends upon the
phrase "such instrument," &c. If these words be construed to
have relation to the intent of the party making the omission,
then whenever any document appears unstamped its validity de-
pends upon the question whether or not in that particular case
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there had been any intention to defraud the government. If, on
the other hand, the term applies to every instrument which has
not been stamped, then it is the unstamped instrument simply
which is void. And both these constructions have been adopted
by different courts.
Looking at the question outside of the authority of the various
decisions, considering the section within itself, a close following
of the grammatical rules for the construction of sentences eems
to favor the former construction. Yet the true construction of
course hinges on the intention of the makers of the act; and
this intention should be followed though such construction seem
contrary to the strict letter: Minor v. Mechanics' Bank of Alex-
andria, 1 Pet. 64; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Id. 622. And statutes
of this nature are not penal in the sense that they must be strictly
construed, but they are to receive a liberal interpretation to ad-
vance the intention: United States v. Twenty-five Cases of Cloth,
Crabbe 356; Taylor v. United States, 8 How. 197; Jortin v.
Southeastern Railway, 6 De G. M. & G. 270.
We may derive much light on the intended meaning of the
section from the way in which it was made up. It is composed
of sections 95 and 100 of the original Act of 1862, revised by
Act of 1864, and amended by Acts of 1865 and 1866.
Sect. 95 of Act of 1862 provided: That if any person or per-
sons shall make, sign or issue, or cause to be made, signed or
issued, any instrument, document, or paper of any kind or descrip-
tion whatsoever, without the same being duly stamped for denoting
the duty hereby imposed thereon, or without having thereupon
an adhesive stamp to denote said duty, such person or persons
shall incur a penalty of fifty dollars, and such instrument, docu-
ment, or paper as aforesaid shall be deemed invalid and of no
effect.
Sect. 100 of the same act provided: That if any person or
persons shall make, sign, or issue, or cause to be made, signed, or
issued, or shall accept or pay, or camse to be accepted or paid,
with design to evade the payment of any stamp duty,' any bill of
I The bill as originally drawn did not contain this clause, but it was inserted in
-the Senate and House on motion. Mr. Sheffeld, when making the motion in the
House, remarked "that it would be very unjust to impose this heavy penalty on a
person who might never have read the statute or known of its provisions." See
Congressional Globe 1861-2, Part "2, Page 1509.
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exchange, draft or order, or promissory note for the payment of
money, liable to any of the duties imposed by this act, without
the same being duly stamped, or having thereupon an adhesive
stamp for denoting the duty hereby charged thereon, he, she, or
they shall, for every such bill, draft, order, or note, forfeit the
sum of two hundred dollars.
In the thorough revision of 1864 these two sections were
brought together; doing away with the distinction between the
two classes of instruments in the amount of penalty imposed, and
making it in all cases the larger sum of two hundred dollars. By
the amendmeut of 1865 the penalty was again placed at fifty
dollars ; and by that of 1866 there was added after the terms
" such instrument," &c., the phrase "not being stamped accord-
ing to law."
It is to be observed with reference to the union of the two sec-
tions 95 and 100 in the new section 158, that it is but a re-enact-
ment of the old sections, and should, therefore, carry with it the
construction which belonged to them. "It is common learning,"
says METCALF, J., in Commonwealth v. Hfartnett, 3 Gray 451,
"that the adjudged construction of the terms of a statute is
enacted as well as the terms themselves, when an act, which has
been passed by the legislature of one state or country, is after-
wards passed by the legislature of another. So when the same
legislature, in a later statute, use the terms of an earlier one
which has received a judicial construction, that construction is to
be given to the later statute." In changes of this nature the
intention to alter the known construction of the old law must
plainly appear, the presumption being in favor of the old con-
strudtion: McKenzie v. The State, 6 Eng. 594; Burnham v.
tevens, 83 N. I. 247 ; Hfughes v. Farrar, 45 Me. 72 ; Conger v.
Barker, 11 Ohio N. S. 1. And even though alterations may
have been made, if terms or phrases are employed which were
used in old acts, the same meaning will be given them as in former
legislation: State v. Southwaite, 3 Zabr. 143; McKee v. Mciee,
17 Md. 352; Ayrick v. iasey, 27 Me. 19; Whitmore v. Rood,
20 Vt. 49.
The phraseology of the revised sect. 158 was substantially the
same as that in the older sects. 95 and 100. The outline of
sect. 95 was retained, incorporating within it sect. 100, retaining
the heavier penalty and with it its accompanying clause with
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reference to intent. Otherwise there was no material change.
And can there be any doubt as to the meaning given to the
phras6 "such instrument," &c., in the earlier legislation ? There is
no room for any other than this; that every untamped instrument
is to be the invalid instrument. "It seems perfectly clear," say
the Revenue Department (Dec. No. 84), "that by the provisions
of sect. 95 the person who makes, &c., without affixing the stamp,
incurs the penalty as aforesaid, and the instrument or document
is invalid in consequence of such neglect:" Boutwell's Tax
System 284; and again in Ruling No. 302, "On and after June
1st 1863, any instrument executed without the requisite stamp
will for that cause be invalid :" Boutwell's Tax System 351.
The legislators plainly had in mind two very distinct ideas:
first, that the stamp was to be an essential, legal part of the
instrument, and that without it there would be no valid instru-
ment; and second, that the person whose duty it was to affix the
proper stamp should render himself liable to a penalty for omit-
ting to discharge this duty, the penalty where heaviest depending
upon the intent of the person. In other words, the intent was
applicable to the person and the penalty for which he was to be
liable, while the validity of the instrument was dependent simply
upon the question whether it was stamped or unstamped; and
"such instrument" having reference solely to the unstamped
instrument.
Applying, then, the rules of law as above stated, to this revi-
sion as it appears in the light of the sections from which it was
drawn, and the argument seems strong that the instrument which
is unstamped from any cause is invalid. At least if the phrase-
ology be ambiguous, as would appear to be the case from the
fact of the conflict between the decisions, the presumption is in
favor of such a construction. And, as if to add the legislative
sanction to this presumption, the amendment of 1866 makes
"such instrument," the one "not being stamped according to law."
And this construction seems to advance the policy of the
section in question. Having a stamp act, it should in some way
be made effectual. To say that every instrument must be
stamped, and then allow that the document is just as good with-
out putting the stamp on, verges on advice more than law. Sect.
158 is to meet this difficulty, and its purpose is to effectually
require the affixing of stamps in accordance with the provisions
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of the Stamp Act. Prescribing a penalty, as is here done, it is
true, meets this in a measure, and yet it does not seem to cover
the broad design which Congress had in view, that is, to make the
stamp a necessary part of the instrument. This done, every
person having any connection with the paper has an interest in
seeing that it is properly made out in this respect as with other
requirements, as, for example, that a seal should be put on a
deed. Making the validity of the instrument depend ,upon the
affixing the stamp required, completely covers the object of the
legislature. It was well expressed 'y Mr. Fessenden, in reply
to a question put to him by a member of the Senate: "The
Senate will notice with respect to all these instruments which it
is provided shall be stamped, that they are of no validity unless
the stamp is put on, and therefore the individual who wants his
business properly done must see that the stamp is on. * * *
It is all provided for by the simple fact that the instrument is of
no validity unless the stamp is put on :" Congressional Globe,
1861-2, part 3, Page 2347.
Stamp acts, however, are not the most popular in this country;
and it must be admitted that the weight of authority is against
this view. On the one hand, that the unstamped instrument is
invalid, without reference to the intent, is held in Iowa (Hugus
v. Strickler, 19 Iowa 413) ; and Nevada (M~aynard v. Johnson, 2
Nov. 25; 2 Id. 16). While on the other hand, that the invalidity
depends upon the intention with which the stamp was omitted is
held in Vermont (Hitchcock v. Sawyer, 39 Vt. 412); Massachu-
setts (Tobey v. Clhiyman, Govern v. Littlefield, Wiley v. Robinson,
13 Allen 123-8; (rocker v. Foley, 13 Id. 376; folyoke Co.
v. Franklin Co., 97 Mass. 150); New York (Beebe v. Huttonj
47 Barb. 187; Vorebeck v. Roe, 50 Id. 302); Pennsylvani,
(Heaovern v. Hosbeck, 53 Penn. 176); Alabama (Blunt v. Bates,'
40 Ala. 470); Arkansas (Dorris v. Grace, 25 Ark. 326); Cali-
fornia (Hallock v. Jaudin, 34 Cal. 167).
Second. Assuming that the validity of an unstamped instrument
depends upon the intent with which the stamp was omitted, the
practical question then often arises; if it appear that an instru-
ment is unstamped, and there is no other evidence with respect
to it, what is the presumption as to its validity?
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in a number of cases
have seemed to take the ground that in all such instances it must
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be presumed that the stamp was innocently left off, and that the
party questioning the validity must show affirmatively, by other
evidence, the fraudulent intent. See Desmond v. Norris, 10
Allen 250; Snell v. Moulton, 12 Id. 396; Govern v. Littefield,
13 Id. 127; Wiley v. Robinson, 13 Id. 128; Crocker v. Foley,
13 Id. 876.
With great deference to the intimation from such high authority,
to us there seems to be a difficulty in this view, in that by it the
act itself is not taken into account. Every man is unquestion-
ably to be presumed innocent till proved guilty ; yet if it appear
that he has done an unlawful act, we presume him to have
intended the natural consequences of that act. In other words
the act throws the burden on the defendant to disprove the intent.
Thus, in cases of murder, "the fact of killing being first proved,
all the circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity are to
be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless they arise out of
the evidence proved against him; for the law presumeth the fact
to have been founded in malice until the contrary appeareth :"
Foster's Crown Law 255; See Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met.
98. In cases of malicious prosecution, the want of probable
cause depends not upon the actual fact but the belief of the party;
yet the fact being shown, the belief and malicious intent may be
inferred, and "the burden put upon the defendants to rebut this
presumption :" Wills v. Noyes, 12 Pick. 327; 1 Phillips on Ev.
632. And these cases are not favored in law: &tone v. Crocker,
24 Pick. 83. To constitute the crime of larceny, there must be
a taking of property with an intent to appropriate it: Common-
wealth v. Adams, 7 Gray 44; but the possession is primd fade
vidence of the intent: Commonwealth v. Willard, 1 Mass. 6;
Phillips on Ev. 634. In cases of false representations, the
intention to deceive and defraud must be alleged and proved;
but the falsehood uttered is sufficient proof of the intention: 1
Phillips on Ev. 683 ; and "where a prosecutor, on an indictment
for forging a receipt with intent to defraud him, swore that he
believed the prisoner had no such intent, the judge directed the
jury that the defrauding being the necessary effect and conse-
quence of the forgery, was sufficient evidence of the intent of
the prisoner to warrant them in convicting; and the judges held
the conviction to be right." (Id. 632.) In the case of Seymour
T. Smith, bankrupt, Judge HALL, of the United States District
